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NOTES
ARGUE WITH SCIENCE? THE ADMISSIBILITY
DEBATE SURROUNDING DNA IDENTIFICATION
The utilization of scientific evidence in litigation has increas-
ingly gained acceptance in the courtroom.' Examples of eviden-
tiary tools that have been employed include radar,' blood testing,'
See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 829 F.2d 757, 757 (9th Cir. 1987) (permitting iden-
tification through use of forward-looking infrared device): Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40,
52 (Ga. 1983) (scientific analysis of fiber evidence played crucial role in murder trial): State
v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382, 1386-89 (R.I. 1985) (admitting voice spectrographic identifica-
tion): Murder Case, Focus Turns to Science, N.Y. TiMES. Mar. 26, 1990, at 24 (murder trial
focused on scientific evidence consisting of DNA, fingerprint and hair analyses). At least
one court found medical evidence sufficient as scientific evidence. See State v. Armstrong,
369 S.E.2d 870, 877 (W. Va. 1988) (court found bite-mark evidence sufficiently reliable to
allow judicial notice): see also RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF
EVIDENCE 217 (1983) (noting that it is "virtually impossible" to try major personal injury
case without detailed medical evidence and that medical evidence is also becoming neces-
sary in criminal cases).
Before scientific evidence is admitted in a trial, the scientific technique must pass the Frye
test: general acceptance in its particular field. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923): see infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing Frye test). See
generally Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595, 649-59
(1988) (reviewing admissibility problems of previous and current scientific advances): Paul
C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Cen-
tury Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1200-04 (1980) (discussing early scientific advances and
courts' dispositions): Judith M. Gordon, DNA Identification Test-On the Way Toward Judicial
Acceptance, 6 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 1, 18-22 (1989) (noting New York courts' acceptance of
DNA testing as reliable enough to pass Frye test).
' See, e.g., State v. Gerdes, 191 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Minn. 1971) (extending judicial notice
to stationary radar): People v. Knight, 72 N.Y.2d 481, 486, 530 N.E.2d 1273, 1275, 534
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and fingerprinting.4 Since only valid and reliable evidence is use-
ful to the trier of fact, all novel techniques and technologies are
necessarily subject to special admissibility hurdles. 5 A current test,
N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1988) (accepting validity and reliability of technique underlying mov-
ing radar as admissible intoevidence); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562, 566, 147 N.E.2d
728, 730, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335, 337-38 (1958). In Magri, the New York Court of Appeals
stated:
We think the time has come when we may recognize the general reliability of radar
speedometer as a device for measuring the speed of a moving vehicle and that it will
no longer be necessary to require expert testimony in each case as to the nature,
function or scientific principles underlying it .... Almost daily, reproductions by
photography ..... X-rays, electroencephalograms, electrocardiograms, speedome-
ter readings, time by watches and clocks, identity by fingerprinting, and ballistic evi-
dence, among a variety of kindred scientific methods, are freely accepted in our
courts for their general reliability, without the necessity of offering expert testimony
as to the scientific principles underlying them. The use of radar for speed detection
may now be said to fall in this category.
Id. See generally JOHN A. TARANTINO. STRATEGIC USE OF SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE § 12, at 456-90
(1988 & Supp. 1991) (analyzing scientific evidence, including speed measurement).
' See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 757 (1966) (upholding constitutional-
ity of taking blood samples and their admission into evidence): Miller v. State, 440 So. 2d
1127, 1129 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (admitting blood-grouping evidence in criminal prose-
cution): State v. Beaty, 762 P.2d 519, 528-29 (Ariz.) (holding blood-grouping tests well
recognized and admissible), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1988); Commonwealth v. Gomes,
526 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (Mass. 1988) (multisystem electrophoresis on dried bloodstain gen-
erally accepted in scientific community): .
The Breathalyzer, which measures blood-alcohol content, was recognized by the New
York legislature as reliable when it provided that "the court shall admit evidence of the
amount of alcohol or drugs in the defendant's blood as shown by a [breathalyzer test ...
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1195 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992): see People v. Donaldson, 36
A.D.2d 37, 40, 319 N.Y.S.2d 172, 176 (4th Dep't 1971). The Donaldson court stated that
-the Legislature has obviously determined that breath tests, if conducted in accordance
with proper procedures, are scientifically reliable for determining the percentage of alco-
hol in the blood." Id.
' See, e.g., Moon v. State, 198 P. 288, 290 (Ariz. 1921) (well settled that fingerprinting
evidence admissible in criminal cases, weight and value to be determined by jury): People v.
Adamson, 165 P.2d 3, 12 (Cal. 1946) (holding fingerprints admissible), affd, 332 U.S. 46,
reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947); People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1081 (ill. 1911) (expe-
rience has shown fingerprinting to be reliable); People v. Roach, 215 N.Y. 592, 604, 109
N.E. 618, 623 (1915) (noting that, although novel, fingerprint evidence admissible). See
generally TARANTINO, supra note 2, §§ 2.01-2.35 at 49-79 (analyzing scientific evidence, in-
cluding fingerprints).
' See Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1247. "INjovel scientific evidence presents significant
reliability problems that may result in erroneous verdicts." Id. Professor Giannelli further
explains that only reliable evidence contributes to the fact-finding function of a trial, and
that reliability depends in part upon the validity of the principle and technique used. Id. at
1200-01: see also CARISON. supra note i, at 218. Proponents of expert witnesses should
elicit testimony about the validity of the theory and reliability of the instrument. Id.: Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 873 Uames W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that some
commentators have suggested substituting validity and reliability test for extent of accept-
ance test).
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DNA profiling,' has been the subject of much scrutiny by courts7
and commentators.8
' See, e.g., Gordon, supra note !, at I ("DNA tests offer a virtually infallible method of
identifying a rapist or murderer from trace amounts of biological material left at the scene
of the crime."). The scientific technique used to compare and analyze the DNA patterns
from two samples has been termed "DNA profiling," "DNA fingerprinting" or "DNA typ-
ing" and has been heralded as a "revolutionary forensic technique." Shannon Brownlee,
Courtroom Genetics, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT. Jan. 27, 1992, at 60: see Janet C. Hoeffel,
The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42
STAN. L. REV. 465, 465 n.3 (1990) (highlighting different names of DNA testing). But see
Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 n.2 (Mass. 1991) (rejecting term "DNA
fingerprinting" because it suggests conclusiveness and is therefore misleading).
DNA identification has been applied in both civil and criminal cases with five private
laboratories and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's forensic lab providing their services.
See LIFCODE:I, CORPORATION. INFORMATION PACKET. at DNA Identity Testing Pamphlet 2
(1991) 1hereinafter LIFECODES] (available from Lifecodes Corp., Valhalla, NY). Lifecodes
Corporation recommends its DNA-PRINT Test for use in the forensic and paternity areas,
claiming "lal minimum paternity probability of 99% for all ethnic groups is ensured!" Id. at
DNA Paternity Test Pamphlet. For further information on the use of DNA profiling in
paternity suits, see generally Aravinda Chakravarti, Ph.D. & Ching Chun Li, Ph.D., The
Effect of Linkage on Paternity Calculations, in 1983 INCLUSION PROBABILITIES IN PARENTAGE
TESTIN; 411, 416-17 (Rene J. Duquesnoy, Ph.D., ed., 1983) (genetic evidence used to ex-
onerate suspect males in paternity dispute); Mary K. Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and
Fantasy:- The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585, 592 n.60 (1991) (dis-
cussing accuracy of DNA testing in establishing paternity); Ronald J. Richards, DNA Finger-
printing and Paternity Testing, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 609, 645-51 (1989) (suggesting use of
DNA testing for positive identification in paternity cases).
" See, e.g., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 58 (8th Cir. 1990) (DNA profiling
relatively new and subject of controversy in legal and scientific communities); People v.
Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 957, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989). The
Castro court undertook an extensive investigation into the DNA forensic identification tests
during a twelve-week pre-trial hearing which produced a transcript of approximately 5000
pages. Id.
Although the previous cases denied admission of DNA typing, several courts have, after
considerable analysis, admitted the test results. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850-
51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (admitted 'genetic fingerprint' evidence based on relevancy
test): People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 332, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 659 (Albany County Ct.
1988) (court admitted DNA evidence but reduced probability statistics by power of ten): see
also State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1990) (recognizing reliability of DNA
evidence).
Many state courts have admitted DNA evidence upon concluding that it satisfies the gen-
eral acceptability test of Frye v. United States. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text
(discussing Frye test): see also People v. Shi Fu Huang, 145 Misc. 2d 513, 517, 546 N.Y.S.2d
920, 923 (Nassau County Crim. Term 1989) (DNA profiling meets test of general accept-
ance): Glover v. State, 787 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (DNA admissible be-
cause principles, procedures, and technology generally accepted); State v. Woodall, 385
S.F.2d 253, 260 (W.Va. 1989) (DNA admissible because deemed reliable by geneticists and
biochemists).
' See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV.
791, 793 (1991) (standard for admitting novel scientific evidence, including DNA, contin-
ues to vex courts): Peter J. Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, DNA Testing, ABA. J., Sept. 1990,
at 35, 35 (authors contend critical differences between diagnostic and forensic applications
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This Note will analyze the admissibility of DNA profiling evi-
dence. Part One will examine the scientific background of DNA
"genetic marking," 9 the procedures currently in use for determin-
ing the likelihood of a match between two DNA samples, and the
accuracy and reliability of population genetics statistics. Part Two
will enumerate the different admissibility standards used in the
Eighth and Second Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals.
Part Three will consider the rationales of these courts and address
whether a judge or jury should decide if proper testing proce-
dures were followed. This question will be examined in light of
concerns about possible unfair prejudice to the criminal defendant
and evidentiary foundational requirements. Finally, Part Four will
discuss how courts might decide this issue in the future, and sug-
gest that a recent New York case provides a viable alternative to
the tests adopted in the federal circuits.
I. THE SCIENCE OF DNA PROFILING
A. Genetic Background
Deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") is the substance in chromo-
somes10 which carries the genetic characteristics that make each
of DNA typing exist, that additional techniques must be developed, tested, published in
peer-reviewed journals, and debated before accepting technology and admitting novel sci-
entific evidence): William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance-and Weight
of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L REV 45, 46-51 (1989) (noting development of
electrophoresis technique): Charles L. Williams, DNA Fingerprinting: A Revolutionary Tech-
nique In Forensic Science and Its Probable Effects on Criminal Evidentiary Law, 37 DRAKE L.
REV. 1, 18 (1987-88) (admission of test results into evidence in criminal cases premature).
"The consensus discernable from commentators, however, suggests that DNA fingerprint-
ing will eventually be proven reliable and will revolutionize criminal law when admitted
into evidence on a regular basis." Id.
' See PAUl. C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 17 (1986 &
Supp. 1991). 'Genetic markers' refer to serological tests (relating to serums) of blood to
determine the race and sex of the source of the blood. Id. § 17-8, at 575-76. This testing
provides assistance in paternity actions. Id. Although genetics refers to the science of he-
redity, mapping DNA has expanded the potential for genetic marking. Id. § 17-8(E), at
603. A gene is a "functional unit of heredity which occupies a specific place or locus on a
chromosome, landl is capable of reproducing itself exactly at each cell division .... "
S'EDMAN'S MEDICAL. DI(.rIONARY 639 (25th ed. 1990) [hereinafter STEDMAN'S]. See generally
Randolph N. Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY LJ
833, 836-43 (1982) (analyzes various blood-grouping tests and their reliability).
10 See STEDMAN'S, supra note 9, at 304. A chromosome is "one of the bodies (normally 46
in a man) in the cell nucleus that is the bearer of the genes ... and is capable of reproduc-
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living thing unique."1 Within the human body, nearly every cell
carries an identical DNA configuration.' 2 However, except in the
case of identical twins, no two individuals have matching DNA
configurations." In forensic analysis, this phenomenon is essential
for linking the DNA "print" extracted from physical evidence,
such as semen, 4 blood,' 5 hair, 6 or saliva'7 to a defendant's DNA
ing its physical and chemical structure through successive cell divisions." Id.: see also K.F.
Kelly et al., Method and Applications of DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide for the Non-Scientist, 1987
CRIM L REV. 105, 105-06. DNA is a human blueprint and is carried in discrete packets of
information known as chromosomes. Id.
" See, e.g., BRUCE ALBERTS E.T" Al... MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 5, 98-108 (3d ed.
1983) (describing importance of DNA and complementary pairing of bases for individual
characteristics and heredity); Debra Cassens Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, A.B.A. J.,
May 1988, at 66, 66 (DNA typing reveals secrets within DNA which carry genetic informa-
tion dictating such individual characteristics as eye color and body size); see also TARANTINO,
supra note 2, § 13.21B, at 80 ("Each human cell has 46 chromosomes arranged in pairs of
22."): Dan L. Burk, DNA Identification: Possibilities and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 JURIMETRIcS J.
53, 72-74 (1990) (discussing DNA's value for determining paternity).
The structure of DNA also makes living things similar, for instance, most characteristics
between people are the same, such as the number of legs and eyes. See Hoeffel, supra note
6, at 470 (stating that sequence of base pairs very similar among individuals).
1, See United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 251 (D. Vt. 1990), affd, 955 F.2d 786
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921). For testing
purposes, the court emphasized the need for cells containing a nucleus to obtain DNA,
since red blood cells do not contain DNA. Id. at n.2.
" See United States v. Young, 754 F. Supp. 739, 740 (D.S.D. 1990) (noting all humans
have different DNA structures): see also Anthony Pearsall, DNA Printing: The Unexamined
"Witness" in Criminal Trials, 77 CAL. L. REV. 665, 667 (1989) (discussing background of
DNA discovery and relevance for identification purposes except between identical twins).
The fact that DNA structure varies among individuals provides the foundation for DNA
fingerprinting. See Jeffrey A. Norman, Note, DNA Fingerprinting: Is it Ready for Trial?, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 243, 243 (1990). Supporters contend that the test "allows for unquestioned
identification of evidentiary samples recovered from crime scenes when compared to sam-
ples from a defendant." Id.
4 See LIFECODES, supra note 6, at DNA Identity Testing Pamphlet 2 (suggesting sources
of DNA and minimum amounts needed for testing). "Since the DNA in all cells from any
individual is the same, DNA from blood can be compared to that from semen, bone mar-
row, hair root, saliva and solid tissues of the same individual." Id. For semen, a sample of 1
to 20 microliters of liquid is necessary. See id. at DNA-PRINT Test sheet. See generally
Alan Giusti et al., Application of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Polymorphisms to the Analysis of
DNA Recovered from Sperm, 31 J. FORENSIC Sci. 409, 413 (1986) (concluding DNA recovered
from semen viable for testing).
" See Lifecodes, supra note 6, at DNA-PRINT Test sheet. Lifecodes suggests I to 100
microliters (up to one drop) if in liquid form, or varying from one-half the size of a dime to
the size of a quarter for dried blood, would be necessary for determining the DNA config-
uration from the white cells. Id.: Evan Kanter et al., Analysis of Restriction Fragment Length
Polymorphisms in Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Recovered from Dried Bloodstains, 31 J. FORENSIC
Sd:. 403, 407 (1986) (determined DNA typing feasible from dried bloodstains aged up to
three years).
"' See Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 61-62 (DNA found in person's hair follicles
601
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configuration.18
The shape of DNA has been identified as a "double helix"
structure, which resembles a twisted ladder 9 (see diagram A). Al-
ternating phosphate and deoxyribose sugar units comprise the
sides of the ladder, while the connectors or "rungs" of the ladder
are composed of pairs of "bases" ("base pairs") known as adenine
("A"), thymine ("T"), guanine ("G"), and cytosine ("C")."0 De-
pending on its chemical composition, each base will bond only
with its complement.2 The different sequences of the base pairs
formulate each person's genetic code.2" Everyone has these ge-
identical to that in his blood, semen, and other bodily tissues). The consistency of DNA has
shown that "DNA found in a man's hair follicles at birth is identical (apart from occasional
slight changes called "mutations") to the DNA found in his blood at age seventy." Id.;
LiFEcons, supra note 6, at DNA Identity Testing Pamphlet 2 (sources of DNA include
hair root).
17 See LIFECODES, supra note 6, at DNA-PRINT Test sheet. The Laboratory recom-
mends 10,000 cells be present in the saliva sample for proper DNA isolations. Id.
8 See Moss, supra note 11, at 66. Tests have shown that the sample merely needs to be a
dried spot of blood about the size of a quarter, a few hairs, a dried spot of semen the size
of a nickel, or a small patch of skin tissue. Id. Criminal investigators view the testing favora-
bly because it provides many more opportunities for linking a suspect to a crime. Id. Along
with indicating that DNA from semen taken from a rape victim matches DNA from a
suspect's blood sample, the test can determine whether a suspect's DNA matches that of
hair left at the crime scene, or from skin scraped by a victim's fingernails. Id.
One commentator noted that "[tihe possibility of identifying a human being by a shred
of tissue or drop of blood has a strong appeal for its potential to revolutionize rape, pater-
nity, and murder cases." Stephen M. Patton, DNA Fingerprinting: The Castro Case, 3 HARV.
J. L & TECH. 223, 223 (1990).
" See, e.g., JAMES D. WATSON ET AL. MOLECU.AR Bioi.oGy OF THE GENE 74, 240 (4th ed.
1987) (complementary double helix identified by Doctors Francis Crick and James D. Wat-
son in 1953): see also United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir.) (discussing
DNA structure), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921).
"0 See, e.g., TARANTINO. supra note 2, § 13.21(B), at 80-81 (discussing cellular biology and
referring to DNA as ladder structure); Kelly, supra note 10, at 106 (providing nontechnical
description of DNA structure).
t See GIANNELI.I & IMWINKEI.RIED. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at 115 (bases combine to-
gether to form base pairs: A always attaches to T, G always attaches to C): see also United
States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 251 (D. Vt. 1990) (order of bases on one side of rung
of DNA ladder determines order on other side), affid, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921); State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847,
850 (N.C. 1990) (certain nucleotides always pair with one another): Spencer v. Common-
wealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 781 (Va. 1989) (these chemical bases always pair together in cer-
tain arrangement), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
Complementary pairing is crucial for DNA testing because it permits scientists to locate
points of differentiation in the DNA chain. See generally C. Thomas Blair, Comment, Spen-
cer v. Commonwealth and Recent Developments in the Admissibility of DNA Fingerprint Evi-
dence, 76 VA. L. REV. 853, 857 (1990) (summarizing DNA typing process).
s See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 791 (genetic code provides biological instructions to cell):
Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 781 (order of nucleotide bases determine genetic code): W. Anthony
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netic sequences,23 but they vary from person to person. 24 Advo-
cates of DNA typing contend that these variations, also called
polymorphisms, 2 5 permit an individual to be identified through
DNA technologies, since it is extremely unlikely that two individu-
als share identical polymorphisms.26 It is suggested that labs ana-
lyzing only a fragment of the DNA may reduce the accuracy of
DNA profiling because research indicates the possibility that spe-
cific groups of individuals may exhibit identical polymorphic
genes more frequently than was considered.
Purcell, Comment, Criminal Procedure-Match Game 1990s: The Admissibility of DNA Profil-
ing-State v. Pennington, 13 CAMPBE.[. L. REv. 209, 216 (1991) (order of DNA bases con-
stitutes genetic code of individuals).
23 SeeJakobetz, 955 F.2d at 791. Approximately 99% of the DNA in each individual is the
same because human beings share more similarities than differences. Id.; Lori L. Swafford,
Comment, Admissibility of DNA Genetic Profiling Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: The Case for
Caution, 18 PEPP. L. REv 123, 124-26 (1990). Human beings have more similarities than
differences, thus the vast majority of base pairs do not vary from person to person. Id.
However, there are certain sections of DNA which vary greatly among individuals. Id.
2' See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 791 (discussing importance of variations for identification
purposes): see also People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 962, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1989) (small variation in order in which base pairs occur on DNA mole-
cule, known as alleles, provide differences among individuals). The Castro court indicated
that early uses for DNA tests involved disease detection, and that sickle-cell anemia is
caused by a single base pair on a single chromosome occurring out of order. Id. at 963, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 989. See generally TARANrINO. supra note 2, § 13.21(C), at 81 (describing signifi-
cance of sequence location).
2 See United States v. Young, 754 F. Supp. 739, 740 (D.S.D. 1990). Although as much
as 99% of the DNA in every person is identical, certain areas known as polymorphisms are
distinct. Id. These polymorphisms are responsible for the unique DNA code of each indi-
vidual. Id.: see also Swafford, supra note 23, at 126 (undisputed distinctiveness is basis for all
forms of DNA testing).
" See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989) ("No two individuals, except
for identical twins, have identical DNA."): see also Moss, supra note 11, at 66. Testing labs
claim the DNA test establishes identity conclusively. Id. One lab, Cellmark Diagnostics of
Germantown, Md., asserts that its "DNA fingerprint" test can identify a individual with
"virtual certainty," and that the chances of any two people having the same DNA finger-
print are I in 30 billion. Id. Lifecodes claims that their research indicates that the likeli-
hood that any two individuals, other than identical twins, having exactly the same
polymorphisms in their DNA segments is extremely remote. LIFECODES, supra note 6, at
DNA Identity Testing Pamphlet 6.
For a general history of the discovery of DNA and its development as a forensic tool, see
Edward Burley, A Study in Scarlet: Criminal DNA Typing Reaches the Courts and Legislatures, 6
J. L & Poi. 755, 759-766 (1990) (outlining development and process of DNA typing):
Leigh C. Lawson, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting and Its Impact Upon Criminal Law, 41 MER-
CER L. REV. 1453, 1454-56 (1990) (same).
604
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B. Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis-A Commonly
Used Testing Method
The length of each polymorphism is determined by the number
of repeat core sequences of base pairs. 27 For example, if A-T is
the specified base pair, the length of the polymorphism is the dis-
tance between the repeated A-T bonds.28 The Restriction Frag-
ment Length Polymorphism ("RFLP") technique, employed by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), 29 seeks to isolate the
different versions of the RFLP's, also called alleles, to determine
whether genetic samples from a crime scene may have come from
a particular suspect."
The seven-phase RFLP process can be visualized as chemically
"unzipping" the DNA ladder into two single strands of DNA, in-
troducing genetic probes which attach to their complementary
strands, and thereby locating the regions of DNA that are
" See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 791. A core sequence is called a Variable Number Tandem
Repeat ("VNTR"). Id.; see also People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 994 (Westchester
County Ct. 1992). VNTR's vary in length even though they are sequentially alike in all
individuals. Id. These VNTR's are highly polymorphic. Id.; United States v. Porter, Crim.
No. F06277-89, 1991 WL 319015, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 1991) (discussing
polymorphisms).
28 See ALBER-rs. supra note 11, at 185-94 (discussing method to separate restriction frag-
ments between corresponding base pairs); Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 470-71 (variations are
polymorphisms).
2" See Porter, 1991 WL 319015, at *3 (FBI uses RFLP technology); United States v. Yee,
134 F.R.D. 161, 169 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (FBI uses RFLP analy-
sis to measure and compare VNTR lengths in evidentiary samples); William S. Sessions,
Guest Editorial, 34 J. FORENSIC SCL 1051, 1052 (1989). DNA analysis is used by the FBI to
help identify violent criminals earlier in the investigation process, and increases the chances
of uncovering the truth. Id. "DNA profiling, like a fingerprint, is becoming a scientifically
and legally accepted means of positive identification." Id.
The DNA typing procedure is performed by six groups, including the FBI and five pri-
vate laboratories. See Comment, Beyond People v. Castro: A New Standard of Admissibility for
DNA Fingerprinting, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEAI.TH L. & POL'Y 269, 278 n.35 (1991) (providing
names and phone numbers of organizations). In addition, some states have expanded the
capabilities of their forensic sciences labs to include DNA typing. See generally Gordon,
supra note 1, at 16-18 (discussing laboratories and testing methods).
"0 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 754 F. Supp. 739, 740 (D.S.D. 1990). In Young, the
RFLP technique was performed by Cellmark Laboratories to determine whether a DNA
match existed between samples taken from a sexual assault victim, her aborted fetus, and
the defendant. Id. The court noted that by the use of these procedures, scientists claim that
they now have the ability to determine if two samples of DNA have come from the same
individual or, as in Young, whether there is a maternal or paternal relationship within the
samples. Id.: see Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 64. The goal of the RFLP analysis is to
identify the polymorphic fragments of the DNA and measure them to determine if they
are from identical sources. Id.
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polymorphic"1 (see diagram A to follow steps of DNA testing).
The first step in the process involves obtaining a sample of biolog-
ical material, like semen, blood, or hair, and extracting the DNA
through chemical treatment and filtering. 2
Next, in a process known as digestion, an enzyme called restric-
tion endonuclease is introduced to locate the polymorphic re-
gions. 3 The enzyme cleaves the DNA at certain recurring genetic
sequences into DNA fragments.3 ' The resultant DNA fragments
are placed on a thin slab of gel and separated according to
length. 5 This is accomplished by gel electrophoresis, a procedure
which applies an electric current to the gel. 6 Since the DNA has a
negative charge, the fragments move toward the positively
charged end of the gel." The rate at which the DNA travels is
3' See, e.g., Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 792 (outlining specific steps of RFLP analysis): see also
Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 65 (describing purpose of RFLP test).
" See Young, 754 F. Supp. at 740-41 (briefly describing RFLP test): see also Perry v. State,
586 So. 2d 236, 238 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (stating that "[tihe [DNA] test takes approxi-
mately three weeks and can be performed accurately from a single strand of hair." (citation
omitted)): People v. Shi Fu Huang, 145 Misc. 2d 513, 515, 546 N.Y.S.2d 920, 921 (Nassau
County Crim. Term 1989) (extraction and isolation of DNA from evidentiary sample is
first step in RFLP process). See generally A.J. Jeffreys et al., Principles and Recent Advances in
Human DNA Fingerprinting, in DNA FINGERPRINTING: APPROACHES AND APPLICATIONS I (T.
Burke et al. eds., 1991) (review of different DNA tests); LIFECODES, supra note 6, at
DNA-PRINT Test sheet (providing various biological samples and amounts necessary to
conduct tests).
" See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1989) (DNA chain cut at specific
sites to form fragment by mixing sample with restriction enzyme): GIANNELLI & IM-
WINKEiRIED. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at 116. The restriction endonuclease ("RE") enzymes
are referred to as "biological scissors" because they cut off a section of the double stranded
DNA "ladder". Id.
1 See GIANNEILI & IMWINKEI.RIED. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at 116. In a properly con-
ducted test, the RE cuts an individual's DNA in the same places every time and therefore
produces the same fragments. Id. Different individuals have different numbers of base pairs
on the fragments cut by the RE. Id.
" See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 781 (Va. 1989) (DNA fragments
grouped according to length on sheet of electrically charged gel), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1036 (1990). See generally Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 69-70 (discussing process of
gel electrophoresis).
See Shi Fu Huang, 145 Misc. 2d at 515, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (discussing process of gel
electrophoresis): Jonakait, supra note 9, at 838-41 (defining electrophoresis as physical
method for separating proteins via electric current); Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at
46-51 (noting development of electrophoresis technique); see also Thomas M. Fleming, Ad-
missibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4TH 313, 352-53 (1991) (describing pro-
tein gel electrophoresis's effect on accuracy of DNA results).
" See People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 966, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 991 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1989). The agarose gel, a "Jell-O"-like substance, is composed of unequally sized
holes. Id. Thus, the fragments of DNA become trapped, according to their size, as they try
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determined by the fragment's size, length, and mass.3 8 Because
the larger fragments move a shorter distance, the fragments will
be arranged according to size, thereby allowing for easier
comparison. 9
Following the denaturation or "unzipping" of the DNA into
two complementary strands, the fragments are transferred to a
sheet of nylon membrane in a process known as Southern Blotting,
to provide a more stable medium for analysis.40 During the next
step, hybridization, radioactive probes are introduced to locate and
bond with particular sequences of the "unzipped" DNA frag-
ments.4' The radioactive probes hybridize with their complemen-
tary restriction fragments on the membrane, and the lengths or
sizes of the resulting bands are polymorphic, hence the term
"RFLP."142
The hybridized array is then exposed to an X-ray film, creating
to reach the end of the gel. Id.; see also Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 848 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (negatively charged DNA moves toward positive charge).
" See Cobey v. Maryland, 559 A.D.2d 391, 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). The distance
the fragments travel depends on their length. Id. The longer, bulkier fragments have a
more difficult time moving through the gel than the shorter fragments. Id.; Pearsall, supra
note 13, at 673 n.40 (explaining separation of molecules by size and weight in electrophor-
esis): Sally E. Renskers, Comment, Trial by Certainty: Implications of Genetic "DNA Finger-
prints", 39 EMORY L.J. 309, 312-13 (1990) (applying electric charge to gel in electrophore-
sis sorts out DNA fragments by size): Ray White & Jean-Marc Lalouel, Chromosome Mapping
with DNA Markers, Sci. Am.. Feb. 1988, at 40, 42 (crediting fragment mobility in electro-
phoresis to length).
" See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 170-71 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (discussing gel
electrophoresis): United States v. Young, 754 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.S.D. 1990) (gel electro-
phoresis results in arrangement of DNA fragments by size along parallel lines); Cobey, 559
A.D.2d at 396 (fragments will be arranged by size).
40 See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 792 (2d Cir.) (describing Southern Blot-
ting procedure), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921). State v.
Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 847, 850 (N.C. 1990) (DNA moved to more permanent surface in
procedure called Southern transfer). For history on the scientist after whom this phase is
named, see Burley, supra note 26, at 772 (highlighting Southern Blotting).
" See Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 966-67, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 991. With the DNA ladder sepa-
rated into a single strand, the probe will locate and bind itself to its fixed complementary
strand contained on the membrane, i.e., if probe DNA sequence is ACTG, it will attach to
TGAC sequence. Id. If there is no such strand, the probe will not bind with anything. Id.:
see also Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775, 782 (Va. 1989) (radioactive probe finds
exact complementary base sequence and binds to that location), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036
(1990).
" Interview with Mr. Steven E. Artandi, M.D.-Ph.D. candidate at the College of Physi-
cians and Surgeons, Columbia University, in New York City, N.Y. (July 6, 1992). The au-
thors would like to express their gratitude to Mr. Artandi for his review and comments on
the scientific aspects of the article.
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black bands which indicate where the radioactive probes attached
to the DNA fragments.' The result of this process of autoradiog-
raphy resembles a grocery bar code.""
Lastly, an interpretation is performed, whereby the technician ei-
ther visually contrasts the patterns, or uses a computer to convert
the pattern to a numerical code for comparison."' The analyst will
conclude that the samples' fragments correlate, that the samples
do not come from the same source, or that the results are incon-
clusive due to sample contamination or other external influence."
C. Probabilities Estimate
When two samples are determined to be from the same source,
the strength of the DNA evidence depends upon the probability
that this pattern of alleles could occur randomly in a specific pop-
ulation group."7 An extremely small statistical probability may
" See Young, 754 F. Supp. at 741 (describing autoradiography process); State v.
Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1989) (X-ray used so DNA fragments can be seen).
" See Cobey v. Maryland, 559 A.D.2d 391, 396 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). The probes
produce dark bands on a white background, an image similar to the bar codes found on
food packages in supermarkets. Id. This is known as an autoradiography or autorad. Id.:
Moss, supra, note 11, at 69 (providing succinct description of steps involved in RFLP and
sample processed film card); see LIFECODES, supra note 6, at DNA Identity Testing Pam-
phlet 11-12, Figures 3 & 4 (supplying visual exhibits of bar codes).
"s See TARANTINO. supra note 2, § 13.21(C), at 83. The author comments that following
the process, the analyst compares the fragment patterns from an unknown sample-the
evidence-with a known sample-the suspect's. Id. If the samples are identical, the analyst
should discover the probe on fragments of the same length in the same pattern. Id. This
match can be detected visually or through the use of a computer. Id. See generally Thomp-
son & Ford, supra note 8, at 74-76 (discussing interpretation of DNA print).
" See People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 994 (Westchester County Ct. 1992) ("In com-
paring the size of the bands to each other, a match, no match, or inconclusive result is
found."): see also United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 171 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (describing
interpretation of DNA test results). While most discussion of the DNA testing focuses on
the positive-identification ability, the results have been used to exculpate innocent parties.
See Charles-Edward Anderson, DNA Evidence Questioned, ABA J., Oct. 1989, at 18, 19
(state declined to prosecute after defendant was exculpated based on DNA results); see also
Sessions, supra note 30, at 1052. When discussing the opening of the FBI's DNA lab, Com-
missioner Sessions stated that DNA profiling can exculpate the innocent. Id. In fact, in
1989, the Governor of Virginia granted a full pardon to a convicted murderer when DNA
tests indicated that another person was responsible for the crime. Id.
" See, e.g., People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 967-69, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992-93 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1989) (discussing "Hardy-Weinberg" equilibrium which is premised on
independent alleles, and its importance for "matches"); see also Gordon, supra note 1, at
25-28 (providing analysis of foundation for population genetics); Hoeffel, supra note 6, at
474 (commonness of particular DNA profile is determined after match is found). See gener-
ally M. Lynch, Analysis of Population Genetic Structure by DNA Fingerprinting, in DNA FIN-
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overwhelm a jury considering whether the defendant was the
source of the evidentiary sample."8 The FBI's "fixed bin" method
provides a foundation for an understanding of the probabilities
estimate.' 9
This procedure involves population genetics and results in a cal-
culation designed to determine if the match is merely a coinci-
dence.50 For instance, in one case, the frequency with which the
defendant's alleles were calculated to occur in the Caucasian pop-
ulation was one in 300 million. 1 For DNA typing, the FBI estab-
GERPRINTING: APPROACHES AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 32, at 113, 120-26 (detailing exam-
ination of population genetic parameters and its application to DNA typing).
"' See Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Mass. 1991). Discussing the
probabilities estimate, the court reversed a criminal conviction, concluding that there is no
demonstrated general acceptance of the process by which Cellmark deduced that I Cauca-
sian in 59 million would have the identical DNA components as that from the forensic
sample. Id. at 442: see also Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(jury required to either accept or reject expert testimony concerning DNA evidence be-
cause it is highly technical and cannot be observed). This facet of DNA fingerprinting has
become the subject of much debate. See infra notes 56-87 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing reliability of DNA profiling test). For an interesting comment on expert testimony, see
Albert J. Slap & Marti Fessenden, Are Forensic Experts an Endangered Species?, 36 J. FOREN-
SIC Sci. 714, 718-20 (1991) (advocating continued acceptance of expert testimony while
permitting jury to determine witness's credibility).
", See Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 171 (analyzing FBI fixed-bin method); Prater v. State, 820
S.W.2d 429, 438 (Ark. 1991) (FBI fixed bin analysis technique used to establish estimates
of probability). See generally Stephen C. Petrovich, Note, DNA Typing: A Rush to Judgment,
24 GA. L. REV. 669, 677-79 (1990) ("The population genetics statistic is, thus, the key as-
pect of the DNA Type."); Acceptability of DNA Evidence is Question for Court, Not Jury: People
v. Morteza Mohit, County Court, Judge D. Silverman, N.Y.L.J.. Jan. 28, 1992, at 21 (reporting
on FBI studies contained in fixed bin analysis as examined in Mohit); Federal Criminal Proce-
dure Admissibility of DNA Evidence, N.YL.J.. Jan. 21, 1992, at 25 (recounting use of fixed bin
analysis for determining frequency of allele fragment length in populations in Jakobetz).
" See Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 80-85 (reviewing probabilities procedure).
Noting that the probabilities estimate has come under scrutiny, Thompson and Ford affirm
that the estimates may vary greatly depending on the test performed and the genetic
probes used for the particular test. Id. at 80. (citation omitted). See generally Michael J.
Dirusso, Note, DNA "Profiles"-The Problems of Technology Transfer, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
R'rs. 183, 209-214 (1990) (reviewing steps involved in calculation and its implications).
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257(U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921). For a nontechnical comparative analysis illustrating the
impact of the statistics, see Edna S. Epstein, The Problem with DNA Tests: Cross-Examining the
DNA Fingerprint, 78 ILL. B.J. 392, 405 (1990). This article states:
Allele patterns are circumstantial evidence to which statistical probabilities are ap-
plied. To explain the concept of allele frequencies, let us assume we have the follow-
ing description of a suspect: wearing a tan trench coat, brown shoes, a green beret,
red leather gloves, and riding a horse. The question is, what is the probability that
two or more individuals would be similarly attired and so mounted? A great deal
may depend on the habits of the community. The attire may be improbable, or it
may be a standard uniform.
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lishes "bins," based on arbitrarily defined ranges of base pair
lengths, for classifying alleles.52 A data base of allele frequencies
was developed from DNA profiles from a targeted group of FBI
agents.53 These profiles permit a calculation for determining the
frequency of occurrence for alleles falling within a particular
bin.54 Assuming that the alleles occur randomly, the FBI multi-
plies the frequencies to arrive at the probability estimate for the
forensic sample. 5
D. Population Statistics
Following location of the polymorphisms and interpretation of
the bands on the DNA-print, 6 an analyst must provide the statisti-
ld.
52 SeeJakobetz, 955 F.2d at 793 (discussing FBI's fixed bin analysis method): GIANNELLI &
IMWINKE.LRIED. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at 130-32 (reviewing FBI's fixed bin procedure as it
relates to targeted populations); Federal Court Holds 'DNA Profile' Evidence Admissible in
Criminal Trial, 59 U.S.L.W. 1059, 1059 (Oct. 16, 1990) (relating FBI's use of fixed bin
genotype-frequency analysis in Jakobetz). See generally Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at
62-66 (describing analysis of allele lengths); Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment,
DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV 903, 908-11 (1988) (analyzing allele
fragments according to their various lengths); Norman, supra note 13, at 245-47 (applying
allele lengths to various populations).
5. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 793. The FBI compiles different data bases for different
groups, including Caucasians, Blacks and Hispanics. Id. In this situation, the Caucasian data
base was developed through blood samples from approximately 225 FBI agents. Id.
It should be noted that a data base is constructed to facilitate the inculpating aspect of
DNA profiling. See Patton, supra note 17, at 228, 233-36. The author indicates that "[fnor
scientific identification evidence to have exonerating power, no probabilities are necessary.
If two samples exhibit non-matching characteristics, they come from two different
sources." Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
5 See United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 259 (D. Vt. 1990) (indicating bin
approach assists in calculation of allele frequencies), affd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921); see also supra note 49 (discussing
FBI's fixed bin analysis). To counter challenges to probabilities estimates, the government's
experts "testified that the FBI's fixed bin analysis is a very conservative estimate of allele
frequency that more than compensates for potential errors that might result from limita-
tions in technology, limited sample population data, substructure or linkage disequilibrium,
and sampling error." Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. at 259.
" See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 793 (describing FBI's use of "product rule"). This "product
rule" is outlined in more depth in Commonwealth v. Curnin, 565 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Mass.
1991). The product rule reflects "the probabilities of the joint occurrence of several statis-
tically independent events." Id. In Cumin, a population geneticist expert witness raised the
concern whether the probability estimates are influenced by the existence of significant
substructuring (subgroups) within racial groups. Id.
" See United States v. Young, 754 F. Supp. 739, 741-42 (D.S.D. 1990). The court recog-
nized the potential for "band-shifting" which causes a false reading, but found the RFLP
test was reliable when properly performed, and therefore the test passed both the Frye and
610
DNA Identification
cal significance of the results."7 A probability estimate is calculated
by determining the frequency of the alleles within a relevant pop-
ulation in order to ultimately calculate the chance that the pattern
from the forensic sample was from someone other than the sus-
pect.5 8 Individual labs have established sample databases, one each
for Caucasians, Blacks and Hispanics, to use when determining the
DNA sequence frequencies within the various racial groups.59 Us-
ing the forensic sample, the lab will prepare three or four probes
garnering six to eight bands for comparison purposes.60 When a
match is isolated, the lab locates the frequency of its occurrence
by referring to the sample database."1 An analyst, utilizing the
"product rule," multiplies together each frequency garnished for
Two Bulls standards for admissibility. Id.; see also Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 87-95
(outlining potential difficulties for interpretation of prints, including print variability or
"slop"). Additionally, these authors note that forensic samples are subject to abuse because
the environmental conditions which the samples encounter can vary significantly and thus
they are not the typical clean lab samples. Id. at 66. Sample degradation may also affect
potential readings. See Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 483 (degraded DNA samples can produce
misleading bands).
'he FBI combats these problems, such as band-shifting, through the use of a computer
imaging process to reference the bands to molecular weight markers on the autoradio-
graph. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 790. For additional proposals regarding standards of per-
formance for forensic laboratories, see Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need For
Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 109, 166 (1991) (stating that labs need uniformity for
reliable results and courts need assistance in judging scientific protocols).
" See, e.g., Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. at 253 (discussing frequencies needed from human pop-
ulation genetics). The statistical probability can be considered as follows: With the assertion
that the chance of a random match is I in 30 million, 30 million people would need to be
tested before a match would occur by chance. See Kelly, supra note 10, at 109. For those
mathematically inclined who desire a more in-depth view of population genetics than dis-
cussed in this Note, see Lynch, supra note 47, at 113 (emphasizing limitations in multilocus
DNA fingerprinting studies).
See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 171 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (FBI developed table
of allele frequencies, applied sample being tested to this table, and multiplied frequencies
using product rule to arrive at probability estimate); Cumin, 565 N.E.2d at 443 (Cellmark
determines allele by allele its frequency in population in its data base); People v. Castro,
144 Misc. 2d 956, 967-69, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992-93 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989) (popu-
lation geneticists identify specific allele frequencies).
" See, e.g., People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991 (Westchester County Ct. 1992) (FBI
lab provided probability estimates for Caucasian, Black, and Hispanic populations): People
v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 327, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 656 (Albany County Ct. 1988) (dis-
cussing DNA groupings); see also GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at
129 (noting that data bases are limited, with Lifecodes's including 2,400 individuals and
Cellmark's 10,000 individuals).
" See Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 84 (discussing procedure for calculating
probability estimate).
61 Id.
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each matching band; these frequencies represent the alleles.6 The
validity of this multiplication procedure assumes that each varia-
ble included occurs randomly and independently of the others.63
However, the reliability of this procedure has been challenged by
population geneticists claiming that alleles do not occur as inde-
pendently as previously assumed."
Population genetics posits that for the alleles to occur ran-
domly, they must not be caused by "linkage disequilibrium,"65
and the relevant racial population must be in the "Hardy-Wein-
berg equilibrium." 6 Linkage disequilibrium can affect the physi-
cal proximity of bands on DNA segments.6 7 Population geneticists
believe that if portions of one person's alleles are identical to
those of another person, it is possible for other identical sets of
alleles to link up, resulting in longer pieces of identical DNA in
two people.68 If an analyst tested these portions of the strand, a
mistakenly positive identification would follow.69 However, labs
" See id. The "product rule" provides as follows: If one band of a match corresponds
with an allele found in ten percent of the population and the other allele represents that
found in fifty percent of the population, the probability of a coincidental match on both
alleles is 0.10 x 0.50 = 0.05, or a five percent probability. See id. at 81-82. See generally
GIANNEII.I & IMWINKEL.RIED. supra note 9, § 17-9(A), at 607-09. (reviewing population
frequencies).
68 See Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d at 327, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (describing random and indepen-
dent conditions needed to ensure appropriate probability determination).
" See Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in a Forensic DNA Typ-
ing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1746 (1991). The authors suggest the need for "subpopulation
studies already carried out for blood groups and enzymes." Id. at 1750; see also GIANNELLI
& IMWINKELRIFD. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at 128-30 (inquiring into existence of subpopula-
tions and effect on estimates); Brownlee, supra note 6, at 60-61 (noting challenges to popu-
lation statistics).
" See Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 491 (suggesting laboratory methods to avoid linkage dise-
quilibrium, nonindependent inheritance of alleles caused by close proximity); Thompson &
Ford, supra note 8, at 85-86 (defining linkage disequilibrium as nonindependence of bands
in DNA prints caused by physical closeness of DNA segments).
" See People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 968, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1989) (indicating allele frequencies must be independent from generation to
generation).
" See Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 85; see also Dirusso, supra note 50, at 211
(discussing "Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium" as set forth in Castro).
" See Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 64, at 1745-46. The authors indicate that a reduc-
tion in "linkage disequilibrium" would cause a particular sequence to be more prevalent in
a certain population, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the probability calculation. Id. at
1747, see also Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 490-92 (discussing linkage equilibrium's effect on
probability estimate): Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 84-87 (nonindependence associ-
ated with linkage disequilibrium).
" See Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 491-92 (describing Lifecodes's declaration of match that
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have diminished this problem by using probes that recognize
widely separated loci.7"
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium provides a formula for deter-
mining population statistics, premised upon a freely mixing popu-
lation, to ensure an equal distribution of alleles within the
groups. 71 Critics argue that the existence of subpopulations, i.e.,
breeding within groups from different racial, religious, or geo-
graphic backgrounds, calls for the rejection of the current
probabilities estimate. 2 Subgroup breeding will cause higher rates
of identical DNA fragments, thereby skewing the results from the
product rule calculation. 3 Because these subgroups exist, popula-
tion geneticists maintain that the use of one database for all Cau-
casians and the use of the product rule to determine an allele's
frequency is improper.7 4 Furthermore, critics contend that the
probabilities of matches among people's DNA fragment se-
quences7" are much fewer than proposed by labs because random
mixing is less frequent in subgroups, due to the fact that popula-
tions tend to engage in "endogamy," or marry within one's
encountered dispute); Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 81-86 (steps for determining
match and associated problems).
70 See Thompson & Ford, supra note 8, at 85-86 (discussing recent use of multiple
probes).
" See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 173 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (adopting FBI proce-
dures for DNA tests). U.S. Magistrate judge James Carr included in his report the distinc-
tion between DNA profiles which are homozygotes (polymorphic form of VNTR produces
one band) and heterozygotes (polymorphic form of VNTR produces two bands) as well as
the FBI's attempt to use a conservative calculation. Id. at 172-73; see also People v. Castro,
144 Misc. 2d 956, 968-69, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 992-93 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989) (utiliz-
ing frequency multiplication formula). See generally Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 489-92 (re-
viewing and challenging Hardy-Weinberg assumption).
"' See Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 64, at 1749-50 (challenging reliability of probability
estimates due to labs' failure to consider subpopulations).
'" See id. Lewontin and Hartl contend that the use of statistical tests for the Hardy-Wein-
berg equilibrium is misplaced as a means to look for genetic differentiation between sub-
groups in a population. Id. at 1747. See generally Gordon, supra note 1, at 25-27 (providing
history for Hardy-Weinberg and relevancy to population statistics).
"' See United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250, 260 (D. Vt. 1990) (describing per-
ceived flaws in probability estimates), aft'd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921); see also Harlan A. Levy, DNA: Race, Ethnicity and
Statistical Evidence, N.Y.L.J., July 15, 1991, at 1 (critics maintain population statistics based
on broad population groupings are useless since there are racial and ethnic subgroups [the
technical term used is "substructures"] within the Caucasian, African-American and His-
panic populations).
" See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (identifying VNTR, core sequence pat-
tern of fragment length, and how it relates to DNA profiling).
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group.7 Additionally, critics maintain that the estimates may be
misleading by "two or more orders of magnitude" because they
ignore the existence of subgroups, thereby reducing the
probability of identification to less determinative numbers.7"
Therefore, they suggest that the estimates be excluded from
courtrooms until proper subpopulation studies can be
performed.78
Contrary to this claim, supporters of DNA typing stress that the
probabilities are "valid estimates" and possible errors will more
frequently balance out than strengthen the estimate.79 Addition-
ally, two scientists reported that a five-locus DNA profile would
have a "vanishingly small" probability of a match, even when ac-
counting for subpopulations. 8 In response to this dispute, the FBI
will examine additional DNA databases of ethnic subgroups,8"
while others call for a national DNA database similar to that for
fingerprints.82
76 See United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181-82, 184-85 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (testimony
involving effect of endogamy); see also Lewontin & Hartd, supra note 64, at 1747-48 (criti-
cizing use of estimates without proper research).
" Lewontin & Hartl, supra note 64, at 1749. The census designation "Hispanic" is a
biological hodgepodge including Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Guatemalans, Cubans, Spanish
and others. Id. See generally John Brookfield, Law and Probabilities, 355 NATURE 207, 207-08
(1992) (analyzing dispute in authority regarding population probabilities).
7" See Yee, 134 F.R.D. at 182 (expert witness noting that using FBI's databases would not
enable him to make accurate probability statement); see also Lewontin & Hartl, supra note
64, at 1750 (current calculations unjustified and generally unreliable).
9 Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work,
254 SCIENCE 1735, 1738 (1991). Dr. Kidd claims that the effect of subpopulations is mini-
mal, noting "ilt makes absolutely no difference ... if the number is 1 in 800,000 or 1 in 5
million." Id.; see Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 SCIENCE 1721,
1721 (1991). Dr. Kidd also indicates that "it probably doesn't matter to a jury either." Id.
" Neil J. Risch & B. Devlin, On the Probability of Matching DNA Fingerprints, 255 SCIENCE
717, 720 (1992).
" See Christopher Anderson, DNA Fingerprinting-FBI Gives In On Genetics, 355 NATURE
663 (1992). Announcing that the FBI will undertake investigation of additional subpopula-
tions, John Hicks, the assistant director of the FBI's laboratory division stated, "we want to
see if there is any great divergence from the kind of distribution of [DNA] alleles we see in
the United States. We've assumed that there isn't." Id.
"2 See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED. supra note 9, § 17-8(E), at 131 (indicating several
states mandate all newly convicted felons such as sex offenders to supply samples for DNA
databases (citation omitted)). See generally Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842, 851 (W.D.
Va. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of Virginia statute directing creation of DNA
database of convicted felons); Joanne Marie Longobardi, DNA Fingerprinting and the Need
For a National Data Base, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 323, 350-57 (1989) (discussing privacy
issues and supporting formation of national DNA database).
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The reliability of the probabilities estimate portion of the DNA
profiling test has received a mixed response in the courtroom.
Population geneticists who challenged this test8" served to amplify
concerns by some courts considering the admissibility of this scien-
tific evidence.8 Of primary concern is whether a minuscule
probability estimate would have an unduly prejudicial effect on a
jury's decision-making.8 5 For instance, a finding that the likeli-
"3 See Lewontin & Hart, supra note 64, at 1745 (questioning assumptions underlying
population groups). The authors maintain that forensic scientists ignore considerable evi-
dence indicating genetic substructure within ethnic populations. Id. at 1746. Further, they
assert "lals currently calculated, the estimates may be in error, possibly by two or more
orders of magnitude." Id. at 1749; see also Brownlee, supra note 6, at 60 (remarking on
prejudicial dangers including falsely implicating suspects). See generally Harlan A. Levy,
DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases: Legal Developments, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 1990, at I (anticipat-
ing population statistic controversy).
" See, e.g., State v. Pennell, 584 A.2d 513 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). In Pennell, the court
considered the defendant's motion in limine to excluded DNA evidence. Id. at 514. Apply-
ing the more relaxed Uniform Rules of Evidence standard rather than the Frye approach,
Judge Gebelein limited the DNA evidence by excluding the statistical probabilities. Id. at
519-20. The court noted the probabilities were not reliable, and prejudicial dangers out-
weighed the probative value of approximate figures derived from calculations based on
populations not proven to be in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and not corrected in a scien-
tifically accepted way. Id. at 519-20; cf Martinez v. State, 549 So. 2d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1989). In Martinez, the defendant argued that the expert's testimony concerning the
probabilities was so overwhelming that it would interfere with the jury's fact-finding func-
tion. Id. Finding the mathematical theory for DNA akin to traditional fingerprint evidence,
Judge Sharp rejected the defendant's approach and admitted the evidence based on its
relevancy and probativeness. Id. at 697. Determining the statistical probability to be relia-
ble and admissible, the court indicated that statistical evidence does not prevent the jury
from considering the issue of identity because the jury may choose to disbelieve expert
witness testimony. Id. See generally Caroline M. Kelly, Comment, Admissibility of DNA Evi-
dence: Perfecting the "Search for Truth," 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 615-16 (1990) (advo-
cating strict standard for admissibility and standardization of testing procedures).
" See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921). The court recognized how "devastating" the
probability estimate can be, noting that: "the results of such testing can be so dramatic as
to become virtually dispositive on the question of identity, which often determines a de-
fendant's guilt or innocence." Id. The Jakobetz court eventually affirmed the defendant's
conviction because it believed that a jury was capable of remaining impartial before being
convinced by the totality of the evidence presented. Id. at 792-93.
The use of the estimate gives the appearance of certainty and reliability which may sway
a juror. See Moss, supra note 11, at 70. Edward Blake of Forensic Science Associates, which
uses polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis, not RFLP testing, claims he expects DNA
typing to become widely used-to the extent that the jury will have little to decide. Id.
This type of undue reliance on the estimates persuaded some commentators to advocate
the more stringent admissibility requirements. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate
in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of
Human Error as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. LQ. 19, 46 (1991) (recom-
mending heightened standard of admissibility for scientific evidence).
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hood of a specific DNA print randomly occurring in the popula-
tion is one in 234 billion appears conclusive,86 especially in light of
the fact the earth's population is approximately five billion. Fur-
ther, the jury may be swayed by these high probabilities that may
not be accurate due to ignored subgroups and the practice of frac-
tional testing.8 7
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSIBILITY
A. Frye v. United States
The landmark case regarding the admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence is Frye v. United States." In Frye, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that before
evidence deduced from a scientific principle or discovery is admis-
sible, such scientific principle or discovery must have gained "gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 9 Al-
though Frye cited neither precedent nor authority, its "general
acceptance" standard was adopted by a large majority of state and
federal jurisdictions." The Frye case itself dealt with a systolic
See Martinez, 549 So. 2d at 695, 697 (rejecting defendant's challenge that probability
estimate was unduly prejudicial, but noting that defense counsel failed to refute underlying
scientific basis of test or Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium formula).
An opponent of the estimate figures insisted that a jury cannot prevent being over-
whelmed "lwlhen an expert comes in and says there's a one in 700 million chance that
your man is not the one-and you know he's only one of 30 million black men in the
country-it just kills you. It intimidates the jury." Gary Taylor, From One Speck, A Case Is
Made, NAT'L. L.J., Jan. 16, 1989, at 3. See generally Charity L. Clayborn, Note, Evidence of
DNA Fingerprints Admitted For Identification Purposes in Rape Trial, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L.J. 543, 551-56 (1990) (discussing standards of DNA testing followed by courts and sug-
gesting uniform standards).
" See supra notes 64 & 72 and accompanying text (discussing fractional DNA testing and
subgrouping's reducing accuracy of DNA profiling).
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
89 Id. at 1014 (emphasis added).
See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.) (majority of jurisdictions
which faced similar issues adopted Frye test, and it remains majority rule), cert. denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921); CARLSON. supra note I, at 220 (for most
jurisdictions, Frye still respected precedent); Hoeffel, supra note 6, at 496 (confirming ma-
jority of jurisdictions accept Frye standard).
For federal decisions applying Frye, see, e.g., United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 961
(6th Cir.) (utilizing Frye as operative standard), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981): United
States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1981) (rejecting evidence as not having
gained general acceptance in its field); United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 654
(9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting contention that technology for lifting shoe prints was not gener-
ally accepted by crime lab technicians).
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blood pressure deception test, an early version of the lie detec-
tor.91 The standard it advocated has since been applied to a
wealth of scientific and technical advances." Many such advances,
including polygraphy" and voice spectrography,9"' have been ex-
cluded from evidence for failure to meet the "general acceptabil-
ity" standard.98
For state cases applying Frye, see, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d
1266, 1285 (Ariz. 1982) (Frye applicable to hypnotically induced recall testimony); People
v. Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Mich. 1982) (declaring Frye is applicable test in Michi-
gan courts): Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 1977) (spectrographic
analysis not sufficiently accepted by scientific community to satisfy Frye). See generally GAN-
NELI.I & IMWINKELRIED. supra note 9, § 1-5, at nn.42-55 (listing state and federal cases that
have adopted Frye as governing test).
" See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (utterance of falsehood requires conscious effort which is
reflected in blood pressure).
" See MCCORMICK. supra note 5, § 203, at 869-70.
Polygraphy, graphology, hypnotic and drug induced testimony, voice stress analysis,
voice spectrograms, ion microprobe mass spectroscopy, infrared sensing of aircraft,
retesting of breath samples for alcohol content, psychological profiles of battered
women, and child abusers, post-traumatic stress disorder as indicating rape, astro-
nomical calculations, and blood group typing, all have fallen prey to . . . [Frye's]
influence.
Id. at 606 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 557 (6th Cir.
1977) (ion microprobic analysis for hair comparisons excluded because not generally ac-
cepted). See generally CARLSON, supra note 1, at 237-41 (setting forth admissibility of scien-
tific evidence per Frye); GIANNELLI & IMWINKELtIED. supra note 9, § 1-5(A-D) at 15-25 (dis-
cussing Frye standard for admissibility of expert testimony on scientific evidence).
"' See GIANNELI..1 & IMWINKELRIED. supra note 9, § 8-2, at 232-48. The authors discuss the
commonly accepted theory underlying polygraphy that when a person being examined
fears detection, his deceptive response produces measurable physiological reaction. Id. The
physiological responses examined include changes in blood pressure, pulse, respiration and
galvanic skin resistance. Id.
See id. § 10-2, at 310-18. Voice spectrography involves a speech sample entered into a
device called a spectrograph, which converts sounds into a visual display known as a spec-
trogram. Id. at 312. An examiner may then compare different spectrograms to determine
if they were made by the same speaker. Id.
" See, e.g., Brown v. Darcey, 783 F.2d 1389, 1391, 1394-97 (9th Cir. 1986) (excluding
polygraphic evidence from trial for failure to meet Frye); United States v. Alexander, 526
F.2d 161, 166 (8th Cir. 1975) (same). For cases excluding spectrography evidence, see
United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding spectrographic
evidence inadmissible because not generally accepted); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d
741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (excluding expert testimony of spectrographic voice analysis be-
cause not generally accepted). See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 5, §§ 206(B), 207, at
907-35 (discussing exclusion of polygraphy and voice spectrography from evidence under
Frye and other standards of admissibility). But see United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351
(1989) (allowing admissibility of spectrographic voice identification); McMorris v. Israel,
643 F.2d 458, 462 nn.9-11 (7th Cir. 1981) (admitting polygraph results into evidence at
trial), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982): United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 186 (4th
Cir.) (upholding exclusion but noting that district judge had discretion to admit polygraph
evidence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194,
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In recent years, the Frye standard has come under attack by
courts and commentators alike, who have expressed dissatisfaction
with its ability to adequately determine the admissibility of many
modern techniques.96 DNA profiling is one such technique.97 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second and Eighth Cir-
cuits have been the only two federal appellate courts to address
this issue. 8 Neither court expressed wholehearted acceptance of
the Frye standard; rather each enumerated what was perceived as
a more viable solution to the evidentiary problem.99 The Eighth
1198-1201 (2d Cir. 1978) (admitting spectrographic evidence under Frye), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing
admission of polygraph testimony if parties so stipulated), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (Mass. 1975) (totality of evidence support-
ing conclusion of general acceptability).
" See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W.
3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921). "[T]he Frye test . . . has been attacked for its
overly conservative approach to admissibility and its susceptibility to manipulation in order
to exclude novel scientific evidence." Id.; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1250. "The Frye test,
which has cast its shadow over the admissibility of scientific evidence for more than a half-
century, has proved unworkable." Id. Professor Giannelli includes in his criticism of Frye
the difficulty in identifying the proper scientific field. Id. at 1208. Also, although courts do
not require unanimous acceptance, there is a broad range of what may constitute "gen-
eral" acceptance. Id. at 1210. Further, Frye may cause a "cultural lag" where it will take a
long time for even properly admissible techniques to be caught up with in the scientific
community. Id. at 1223; Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to
Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 883 (1982) (Frye standard has been criticized, limited,
modified, and faces increasing rejection). McCormick further states that the adoption of
new rules of evidence has caused critical examination of the Frye standard. Id. at 887; see
also Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 ("determination of reliability cannot rest solely on a process
of 'counting (scientific) noses' "); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.)
(without expressly rejecting Frye, applied relevancy analysis), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975); Joseph G. Petrosinelli, Note, The Admissibility of DNA Typing: A New Methodology, 79
GEO. L.J 313, 317-18 (1990). "The general and imprecise language of the Frye test has
generated debate over the test's actual requirements." Id. at 318. Four concerns have been
raised, namely, what is general acceptance, what is capable of general acceptance, who de-
termines the reliability of the evidence, and when the test is applied. Id.
"' See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing DNA
test as novel scienific evidence). The Florida District Court of Appeals became the first
court in the United States to use DNA evidence in support of a conviction. Nancy Slater,
Current Issue, DNA Fingerprinting: Dick Tracy of the '90s, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
183, 196 (1989); infra notes 102-125 and accompanying text (illustrating current split of
authority in circuit courts).
" SeeJakobetz, 955 F.2d at 795 (noting that Eighth Circuit was only other federal circuit
court to address issue).
" See id. at 794 (holding Frye standard had previously been superseded.by Federal Rules
of Evidence); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990) (court must
-satisfy itself that sufficient foundational basis exists before admitting DNA evidence which
is potentially unduly prejudicial to defendant): infra notes 102-125 and accompanying text
(describing DNA admissibility standards used by courts).
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Circuit adopted Frye but added an additional restriction to admis-
sibility."' 0 The Second Circuit embraced an approach less restric-
tive than the Frye test and, therefore, was more receptive to DNA
profiling evidence.10 '
B. Eighth Circuit: United States v. Two Bulls
In United States v. Two Bulls,102 the court, in an opinion by Chief
Judge Lay, adopted the same standard proposed in People v. Cas-
tro,103 which advocated an admissibility test more stringent than
the Frye test.10' The Castro approach requires a three-prong exam-
ination of novel scientific evidence to determine admissibility." °
Applying this test to DNA profiling, the courts must first deter-
mine whether there is a generally accepted theory in the scientific
community which finds DNA testing results reliable.10 Second, it
must decide if there are techniques, generally accepted in the sci-
entific community, that are capable of producing reliable results
in DNA identification. °10 These first two elements are essentially
the equivalent of the Frye test.1 0 8 However, the Castro and Two
'" See Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60 (mandatory pretrial hearing held to determine whether
particular laboratory which performed test used accepted techniques).
'1 See jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 794 (in attacking Frye for its overly conservative approach,
court adopted Federal Rules of Evidence approach which is more permissive in determin-
ing admissibility).
102 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990). In Two Bulls, a 14-year-old girl was raped on an Indian
Reservation in South Dakota. Id. at 57. The semen stain found on the victim's underwear
was tested against a sample of blood taken from the defendant, Two Bulls, and indicated a
match. Id. Based on Native American population figures, experts testified that the statisti-
cal probability that the stain could have come from someone other than Two Bulls was I in
177,000. Id. at n.2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
the standard for admissibility used at trial was improper, vacated the conviction, and re-
manded the case. Id. at 61. The court found that the propriety of the labs' testing proce-
dures must be considered in determining the admissibility of the DNA evidence. Id.
103 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989); see Two Bulls,
918 F.2d at 60 (court accepted three-prong test put forth in Castro).
10" Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
105 Id. at 959, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987; see United States v. Medina, 749 F. Supp. 59, 62
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (in admitting novel scientific evidence, court should determine that same
was obtained properly, laboratory technique was sound, and laboratory was accurate in use
of technique); United States v. Young, 745 F. Supp. 739, 741 (D.S.D. 1990) (utilizing test
incorporating three prongs of Castro); infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text (outlin-
ing Castro test).
' Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 959, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
107 Id.
108 Compare Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987 with United States v. Frye,
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Bulls courts imposed an additional burden on the proponent of
DNA evidence in a criminal case. 109 This third element requires
the court to' determine whether the testing lab properly per-
formed the accepted scientific techniques in analyzing the DNA
samples in the particular case."' The Two Bulls court explained
that its test is applicable to other types of novel scientific evidence
as well."'
C. Second Circuit: United States v. Jakobetz
In United States v. Jakobetz," 2 the Second Circuit defined the
guidelines for determining the admissibility of DNA profiling evi-
dence."' In an opinion by Judge Pratt, the court relied heavily on
standards implicit in the Federal Rules of Evidence." 4 In particu-
lar, the court suggested that the "balancing test" enumerated in
Rule 403, which excludes evidence when its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," 5 cou-
pled with Rule 702, which allows for the testimony of expert wit-
293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating respective admissibility tests); see supra notes
88-95 and accompanying text (discussing Frye test).
"" United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990); Castro 144 Misc. 2d at
959, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
" Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60; Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 959, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
.. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60.
'" 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-
7921).
t Id. at 789. The facts of the case indicated that a woman travelling on vacation was
accosted and kidnapped from a roadside rest area and later raped. Id. at 789-90. Tele-
phone records from the rest area pay phones linked Jakobetz to the crime-he phoned his
wife immediately prior to a phone call made by the victim. Id. at 790. Hair samples that
matched the victim's, and other physical evidence tying Jakobetz to the events were discov-
ered in his truck. Id. Furthermore, the victim was able to positively identify Jakobetz in a
photographic lineup. Id. Jakobetz sought to suppress evidence of a DNA profiling study
which found that a semen sample from a vaginal swab of the victim was genetically alike in
construction to a blood sample taken from him. Id. at 789. At trial, experts for the prose-
cution testified that the probability that the semen sample came from someone other than
Jakobetz was 1 in 300 million. Id. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that the DNA evidence was properly admitted and affirmed the Dis-
trict Court's conviction of Jakobetz. Id. at 800, 807.
.. Id. at 795, 796 (citing Rules 403 and 702).
"I FED. R. EvID. 403. This rule provides that: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id.
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nesses,"1 should govern the admissibility of this type of evi-
dence."' This "relevancy" analysis provides that conclusions
which are supported by expert witness testimony should be admit-
ted into evidence unless the danger of unfairly prejudicing or mis-
leading the jury exists. 1 8 This test relies on the premise that the
Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the Frye test," 9 as was found
in United States v. Williams. 2 '
In Williams, Chief Judge Markey suggested that the probative-
ness, materiality and reliability of evidence must outweigh any
tendency it may have to mislead, prejudice or confuse a jury. 2'
The Williams court went on to enumerate five suggested determi-
nants of reliability: the potential rate of error, the existence and
maintenance of standard testing procedures, the care and concern
with which the technique has been employed, the ability to analo-
gize evidence in question to other forms of evidence which are
generally admitted, and the demonstration of the test's failsafe
characteristics. 2 Once these factors are satisfied, the court may
1,6 FED. R. Evso. 702. This rule provides that: "[ilf scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
"I United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921); see Stephanie B. Goldberg, A New Day for DNA?, A.B.A. J.
Apr. 1992, at 84, 84-85 (describing Second Circuit as "relevancy plus" jurisdiction).
1,8 See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 203, at 875 (relevant conclusions should be admitted
absent clear reasons for exclusion); cf Black, supra note 1, at 597. To alleviate the difficulty
surrounding the admissibility of scientific evidence, the author proposes a two-pronged rel-
evancy test. Id. First, the validity of the reasoning of a conclusion and next, the reliability
of that conclusion. Id.; Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L. REV.
447, 447 (1990). The admissibility of "every piece of evidence offered" hinges on its rele-
vancy. Id. See generally FED. R. EvID. 401. This rule provides that: "[r]elevant evidence
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Id.
"I See MCCORMICK. supra note 5, at 608 (general acceptance in community not suitable
for determining admissibility of novel scientific evidence); Petrosinelli, supra note 96, at
322 (stating that proponents of relevancy test argue that Federal Rules supersede Frye).
Some jurisdictions have applied a modified relevancy analysis. See, e.g., United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985) (Federal Rules of Evidence neither incorpo-
rate nor repudiate Frye); see also Petrosinelli, supra note 96, at 323 (many of same inquiries
would be made under Frye and modified relevancy test).
110 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978). The Williams court discussed standards in determining
reliability with respect to spectrography. Id. at 1198.
"' Id. at 1198.
"' Id. at 1198-99.
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properly apply the test which "boils down to a balancing of the
reliability of the evidence against its potential negative impact on
the jury." 2 ' Although Williams did not deal specifically with DNA
evidence,""' the Jakobetz court adopted its rationale as applying to
all forms of novel scientific evidence.1
25
III. PROPER SCIENTIFIC PROTOCOL: WEIGHT OR ADMISSIBILITY?
Should a determination of whether proper scientific protocol
was followed in the testing procedures be one of weight for the
jury, or one of admissibility for the court? The Two Bulls court
concluded that a showing of proper scientific protocol was a pre-
requisite to the admissibility of scientific evidence. 2" In support of
its position, the Eighth Circuit advanced the theory that there is
an increased possibility of unfair prejudice to a criminal defendant
if the determination is left to the jury, since it has been argued
that jurors tend to give unwarranted weight to hypertechnical sci-
entific testimony that is outside the realm of their
understanding. 127
Another argument in favor of the position taken by the Two
Bulls court is that for all scientific evidence, a proper foundation
'" United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3257
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (No. 91-7921).
124 Williams, 583 F.2d at 1196. The scientific evidence involved in Williams was spectro-
graphic voice analysis. Id.
'2 Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796.
'" United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990). "[Plassing muster under
Frye alone is insufficient to place this type of evidence before a jury without a preliminary
critical examination of the actual testing procedures performed in a particular case." Id. at
59 (citing People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 960, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1989)).
'I d. at 61; see Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796 (defendant insisted that jury was unable to
independently scrutinize DNA evidence in light of complicated expert testimony and urged
that an "aura of mystic infallibility" surrounding evidence led jury to abdicate its fact-
finding function, prejudicing his defense). This argument finds further support in the cases
and commentaries on this subject. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.)
(apparent objectivity of scientific testimony may cause jury to give it undue weight), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1974). "[Sjcientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in
the eyes of a jury of laymen ...." Id. at 744; GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED. supra note 9, § I-
6(B), at 33 (principal danger of scientific evidence is its potential to mislead); Hoeffel, supra
note 6, at 511. Jurors are not likely to second guess the opinions of experts testifying about
DNA test results. Id. Also, jurors in early DNA cases "were in no position to reject evi-
dence as exciting and as intimidating as DNA typing." Id. at 515.
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must be laid before it can be admitted. 2 The Eighth Circuit held
that the necessary foundation included a demonstration that
proper scientific protocol was followed in each particular case.129
Such a showing should be made at a pre-trial hearing to deter-
mine whether or not the jury will be allowed to use the evidence
in drawing its conclusions.1 °
However, in the Second Circuit, the Jakobetz court believed that
whether proper scientific protocol was followed is a determination
to be made by the trier of fact, generally the jury. 13  The court
found that DNA evidence should not require its own special stan-
dard of admissibility and argued that determining whether or not
the test was properly conducted was clearly within the province of
the jury.3 2 Proponents of the relevancy test for determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence provide support for the
Second Circuit's arguments since they believe that all relevant evi-
dence should be admitted absent a clear reason for excluding it.'"3
Additionally, as noted in United States v. Williams, sufficient inher-
ent procedural safeguards exist to warrant allowing such testi-
mony to reach the jury." The credibility of the expert, the accu-
'" See Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60 (proper foundation must be laid for all scientific tests
and lab procedures).
I Id. at 60. "If the court has explored only scientific acceptability and the reliability of
acceptable testing procedures in camera, and then, at trial the government fails to show
that the lab tests did conform to reliable procedures, the court would have to exclude the
evidence for lack of foundation." Id. The court further stated that for other types of scien-
tific evidence, including polygraph and blood tests, such a stringent foundational require-
ment, a showing that correct procedures were followed, has been necessary. Id. (citing
Sprynczatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122-24 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1046 (1986); see United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-64 (8th Cir.
1975) (refusing to admit polygraph test where procedures not generally accepted); see also
State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989) (DNA test results only as reliable
and accurate as testing procedures used by particular laboratory); lmwinkelried, supra note
85, at 28-29 (use of proper test protocol should be prerequisite to admitting scientific
evidence).
1' Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60.
"I Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796; cf Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 304
(4th Cir. 1984) (experts should debate acceptability of scientific data before jury).
"' Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796.
', See MCCORMICK. supra note 5, § 203, at 875 (contending jury should consider all rele-
vant evidence); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
§ 7021031, at 702-30 (1991) (jury intelligent enough, with assistance of counsel, to consider
only helpful evidence).
13 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979).
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racy and reliability of his equipment and the technique itself are
all subject to challenge and attack on cross-examination and
through the testimony of opposing experts.1 3 5 Also, the jury can
be instructed that, should it find the testimony unreliable, it may
reject it.' 36
Furthermore, rather than proving to the judge prior to the trial
that the proper scientific protocol was followed, as was done in the
Eighth Circuit,13 7 the Jakobetz court favored a more relaxed ap-
proach to the foundation question.13 8 The court stated that scien-
tific data should be admitted only upon a preliminary showing of
reliability. 139 Such a showing might include evidence of how the
lab work was conducted and what analysis and assumptions under-
lie the probability calculations. 4 ° The court found that affidavits
regarding the testing procedures used would generally be consid-
ered a sufficient foundational basis for admitting DNA profiling
evidence. 41 The fact that only a preliminary showing was neces-
sary is consistent with the policies underlying the relevancy test
advocated in Williams' 42 and would allow a jury to retain its fact-
finding function. 43
IV. THE FUTURE OF DNA PROFILING
In determining the standard for admitting DNA profiling evi-
dence, the Eighth and Second Circuits have advocated compre-
hensive, yet disparate, approaches.' 44 Such inconsistent authority
1"5 Id.
136 Id.
"17 United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990); see supra notes 126-130
and accompanying text (outlining Eighth Circuit's holding regarding laying foundation for
evidence).
'" SeeJakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (factual determination should rarely be excluded from
jury).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
141 Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (Williams dealt with question of determining admissibility,
not with truth or falsity of scientific "fact" or "truth"); see MCCORMICK, supra note 5,
§ 203, at 876. "IT]he rigor of the requisite foundation can be adjusted to suit the nature
of the evidence and the context in which it is offered." Id. (footnotes omitted); supra notes
120-123 and accompanying text (discussing Williams's reliability analysis).
143 SeeJakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (jury must retain fact-finding function despite difficulties
in weighing confusing evidence).
'44 See supra notes 102-125 and accompanying text (discussing approaches taken in
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will necessarily cause federal and state courts facing this issue in
the future to adopt either the relevancy test employed in
Jakobetz,1" the three-prong analysis favored by Two Bulls,14 6 or, it
is suggested, a different approach likely to combine elements of
each.
Recently, in People v. Mohit, 1 7 the Second Judicial Department
of New York was called upon to address the admissibility of DNA
evidence .14  There, the court relied on the general acceptability
standard of the Frye test. "1 9 The primary focus was whether
probability estimates should be considered as a matter of admissi-
bility for the court, or allowed into evidence upon only a prelimi-
nary showing to the judge, to be weighed by the jury later. 50 The
Mohit court held that whether or not the probability estimates
were proper was an issue of admissibility. 1 In arriving at its deci-
sion, the court rejected the Second Circuit's decision in Jakobetz to
allow the jury to weigh the propriety of the probability esti-
mates." The court explained that this issue was in part demon-
strative of the overall general acceptability, and therefore, an ad-
missibility issue. " The Mohit court expressly rejected the third
prong of the Two Bulls analysis, by declaring that whether or not
the experiment was properly conducted should be an issue of
Eighth and Second Circuits).
18 Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 796-97; see supra notes 112-125 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing approach taken in Second Circuit).
' Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 60; see supra notes 102-111 and accompanying text (discussing
approach taken in Eighth Circuit).
..7 579 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Westchester County Ct. 1992).
146 Id. at 991. The defendant, Dr. Mohit, was indicted for raping and sexually abusing a
patient during an office examination. Id. Semen was recovered from a vaginal swab of the
victim and was tested along with the defendant's blood to determine the possibility of
matching DNA characteristics. Id. A match was declared, and it was held that "the
probability of such a match occurring in the United States was 1 in 67,000,000 for Cauca-
sians, I in 79,000,000 for Blacks, and I in 14,000,000 for Hispanics." Id. The court held
that the DNA evidence was admissible, yet it limited the probability estimates. Id. at 999.
" Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 991; see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing
Frye test).
1o Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 993. "If ... a reliable match is made, but the probabilities
attached are not reliable, should the proponent of the evidence be denied its admissibility
altogether?" Id.
I ld. at 993-94.
I8 d. at 993.
I" d. at 992.
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weight for the jury. 5 In so holding, Mohit advocated an approach
whereby the court could examine the probability estimates, mod-
ify them as necessary, and then submit them to the jury to be
weighed for their usefulness and credibility.1 55 The court further
suggested that the entire issue could be remedied if statutorily ac-
ceptable uniform laboratory standards and procedures were
developed. 156
CONCLUSION
There are a great many concerns that the courts must address
in determining the admissibility of DNA profiling evidence. While
the Eighth Circuit feared that the leniency of the relevancy ap-
proach might cause unfair prejudice to the criminal defendant,
the Second Circuit felt that the strictures of the Two Bulls ap-
proach would keep valuable probative evidence from the jury. It
is suggested that the approach taken by the court in People v.
Mohit would do much to alleviate these fears. The Mohit court pro-
vides an alternative whereby the traditional roles of judge and
jury are left substantially intact. The approach it advocated en-
sures minimal unfair prejudice to the criminal defendant, while
allowing maximum probative use of the currently available
technology.
Daniel C. Burke & Brian J. Whiteman
Id. (citing People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d. 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1989)).
People v. Mohit, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Westchester County Ct. 1992). The court
enumerated its own three-step analysis, posing the following questions:
1. Does the laboratory in question utilize procedures or protocols which are gener-
ally accepted as reliable within the scientific community (here the relevant scientific
community being molecular biologists);
2. Are the principles utilized in the laboratory in calculating the probability of a
match generally accepted as reliable within the scientific community (here the rele-
vant scientific community being population geneticists and human geneticists):
3. If the laboratory procedures are acceptable, but the probability estimates are not,
is the means of quantifying the probability of a match in a manner which would be
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, even if most would con-
sider the estimate to be too high.
Id.
I" Id.
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